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Abstract 
Recent H5N1 influenza research has revived the debate on the storage and manipulation of 
potentially harmful pathogens. In the last two decades, new high biosafety (BSL-4) laboratories 
entered into operation, raising strong concerns from the public. The probability of an accidental 
release of a pathogen from a BSL-4 laboratory is extremely low, but the corresponding risk -- defined 
as the probability of occurrence multiplied by its impact -- could be significant depending on the 
pathogen specificities and the population potentially affected. A list of BSL-4 laboratories throughout 
the world, with their location and date of first activity, was established from publicly available 
sources. This database was used to estimate the total population living within a daily commuting 
distance of BSL-4 laboratories, and to quantify how this figure changed over time. We show that 
from 1990 to present, the population living within the commuting belt of BSL-4 laboratories 
increased by a factor of 4 to reach up to 1.8% of the world population, owing to an increase in the 
number of facilities and their installation in cities.  Europe is currently hosting the largest population 
living in the direct vicinity of BSL-4 laboratories, while the recent building of new facilities in Asia 
suggests that an important increase of the population living close to BSL-4 laboratories will be 
observed in the next decades. We discuss the potential implications in term of global risk, and call for 
better pathogen-specific quantitative assessment of the risk of outbreaks resulting from the 
accidental release of potentially pandemic pathogens. 
  
Introduction  
In recent years there has been a huge proliferation in the study of pathogens, which has promised 
many breakthroughs in human health. This has led to several new high biosafety (designated 
Biosafety Level 4 or BSL-4) laboratories entering into operation [1,2]. However, experimentation with 
pathogens is not without risk. There have been strong concerns from the general public [1] and the 
scientific community [3–6] over the handling of potentially deadly human pathogens, in part fuelled 
by the recent work on H5N1 influenza [7,8]. A recent study quantified the risk that an accidental 
release of such pathogen could not be contained in the local community, and showed that this would 
be strongly influenced by the vicinity of the laboratory in terms of human population, i.e. that the 
risk would be higher in urban than rural context [9]  
The probability of the release of a pathogen from one of the highest biosafety laboratories can be 
considered to be extremely low [10] and is in theory comparable for all BSL-4 laboratories. All 
facilities follow standardized criteria and use similar materials and resources to enable them to 
operate at the highest security level. However, this is nothing exceptional [11]. An interesting 
precedent in risk assessment of potentially dangerous scientific research was set by an experiment 
carried out at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). The probability that the experiment could create black 
holes during its operation was seriously evaluated, because of its potentially devastating 
consequences, despite the belief that the probability of such an event occurring was extremely low 
[12]. Similarly, the assessment of security in nuclear power plants also involves extremely low 
probabilities of events, but is evaluated extremely carefully; the recent example of Fukushima 
highlights the dramatic consequences of an unexpected sequence of contingencies. Leaks in high 
biosafety laboratories have occurred in the past [11,13,14], some of which have resulted in local 
contagion [14] and could have resulted in large-scale epidemics.  In a first effort to better 
characterize this risk, we quantified how the population living in the vicinity of BSL-4 laboratories has 
changed over time. 
A list of existing BSL-4 facilities was assembled from publicly available sources of information 
including the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention (Data and Methods section). The list 
included the geographical coordinates (Fig 1, A) of each facility and the date it started its operations. 
The next step involved evaluating the size of the population that lives in the vicinity of each 
laboratory representing a potential biological hazard. We considered the hypothetical situation 
where a lab-worker is accidentally infected to estimate the population living within the commuting 
belt for this worker. Specifically, we estimated the population size living within a typical 30-minute 
commute (15, 16) of each laboratory (Fig 1 B-D). The global population living in the direct vicinity of 
BSL-4 laboratories was then defined as the total population living within the commuting belts of all 
facilities.  
Data and Methods 
 
List of BSL-4 Laboratories 
 
A list of existing BSL-4 facilities was assembled from publicly available sources of information such as 
institutions and non-governmental organization (NGO) websites, scientific publications [15] national 
newspapers and the archives of the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention. The list included 
the name, coordinates and period at which the facility entered in operation. For simplicity and 
because there was some uncertainty in some of the dates, four periods were identified, before 1990, 
1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010 and after 2010. When an opening year could not clearly be identified, 
different sources were crossed to identify the period during which the facility opened (See column 
Operational Date in Supplementary Table 1). Out of 55 listed laboratories, three (Veterinary 
Laboratories Agency, United Kingdom, Republican Research and Practical Center for Epidemiology 
and Microbiology Belarus and Preventive Medical Institute of the Ministry of National Defence, 
Taiwan) could not be assigned a starting period because of insufficient information. These three 
laboratories were therefore excluded from the analysis; although they may still exist.  
The list established is undoubtedly incomplete with regards to all facilities suspected to exist, 
because countries do not all communicate with an equivalent level of transparency regarding their 
research activity on dangerous pathogens. However, in the absence of an official and transparent list 
of BSL-4 facilities maintained at the international level, the present list may be considered as the 
most up-to-date source of information. Finally, several countries distinguish between facilities 
operating on human or animal pathogens. However, recent research on influenza indicates that this 
discrimination is obsolete for a range of pathogens, and therefore the BSL-4 laboratories described in 
this study include both types of facilities.  
The authors stand ready to update the list established with any information arising from the 
concerned institutions regarding localization or dates when facilities entered in operation, and to re-
evaluate their estimates accordingly.   
Commuting Belts and Demography Maps 
 
A friction surface was used to delineate a commuting belt of 30 minutes around each laboratory. In 
this case, the friction surface used contained the value in minutes required to cross a 1 kilometer 
pixel [16]. The time to cross each pixel from a friction surfaces is calculated from maps of 
environmental and anthropogenic variables such as de type of land use, transport networks 
elevation, slope etc.  Using a cumulative sum function combined with such a surface allows us to 
calculate an isochronal belt reachable for a hypothetical lab worker commuting home on a 30 
minutes journey. These commuting belts were then used to sum up the population in the direct 
vicinity of each laboratory, as reported on figure 2 and 3.  A sensitivity analysis using commuting 
duration of 10 to 60 minute was conducted to insure the consistency of the pattern observed across 
a range of plausible commuting values (SI Fig. 1,2).    
The threshold value of 30 minutes was chosen since it lies within the observed range of values for 
developed countries across the different periods: according to different sources the average 
commuting time in the US in 2009 was 25.1 minutes [17]  and 37.5 minutes in western Europe in 
2000 [18].  
The demography maps used were obtained from the Global Rural Urban Mapping Project [19] 
population database for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. The demography estimates for the year 
2010 were used both for 2010 and the post 2010 period as most laboratories expected to be built 
after 2010 and included in this study are due in 2012. 
All the analyses were carried out in the statistical programming language R (cran.r-project.org/) and 
the maps produced with ArcGIS 9.3 (www.esri.com).  
  
Results 
Our findings showed that the global population living within 30 minutes of BSL-4 laboratories 
increased from 30,165,678 in 1990 to 42,456,931 in 2000 and to 96,986,631 in 2010. Prediction 
based on facilities built since 2010 or currently under construction suggested that this figure should 
increase up to 126,146,118 after 2012. Overall, this represented a 4-fold increase from 0.57% of the 
world population in 1990 to 1.8% after 2012.  
The dramatic increase in the total population living in the immediate vicinity of BSL-4 laboratories 
was primarily due to the increase in the number of laboratories (12 in 1990, 17 in 2000, 42 in 2010 
and 52 after 2012). Comparatively the population growth around the existing laboratories, only 
accounted for 5.2% of the increase since 1990 (Fig 2). The construction of new facilities in densely 
populated areas played a key role in the predicted rise in the population exposed. A sensitivity 
analysis on the commuting time between 10 and 60 minutes showed these figures to range from 
29,040,972 to 246,272,658 people for the post 2012 period. Interestingly, we find that smaller 
commuting belts (10 minutes) contain more individuals than would be expected from a simple 
geometric argument (eg a 30-minute commuting belt contains less than 9 times the number of 
individuals within the 10-minute belt). The ratios of population between the different commuting 
belts were respectively: P30min/P10min = 4.29 instead of 9 and P60min/P30min = 1.97 instead of 4. This 
suggests that laboratories tend to be located in the locally highest population densities. This trend is 
also illustrated by Figure 3a -- whilst there are far fewer BSL-4 laboratories in Asia than in North 
America, there are a larger number of people living in the immediate vicinity of these laboratories. 
Europe hosts the largest number of laboratories and because of its densely populated landscape; it 
also has the largest population of people living in the commuting belts of these facilities. Figure 3b 
shows how the top 10 facilities having the largest population in their commuting belts have changed 
over the last two decades. The situation in 1990 reflected the historical context at the end of the cold 
war, with five laboratories in the top 10 located in NATO countries and a further three in the USSR. 
By 2000, nine out of ten laboratories with the largest population in their commuting belt were in the 
western world, with the 10th lab being located in South Africa. By 2010, new facilities had been 
constructed in densely-populated areas in Europe (London, Milan, Hamburg) and in Asia (Taiwan, 
Singapore).  According to the predictions for the post 2010 era, India will make a noticeable entry in 
this ranked list, with the country's first two BSL-4 facilities being built in Pune (5.5 million inhabitants) 
and Bhopal (1.8 million inhabitants). Meanwhile North America only had one facility left in this top 
10 in 2010: the NIH in Bethesda, Maryland, USA.  Interestingly, in all four periods the United Kingdom 
was the nation with by far the highest population living in the vicinity of BSL-4 laboratories. This 
stemmed both from the record number of BSL-4 facilities in the country (9, in 7 sites) and their 
distribution in and around the capital city of London, the largest city in Europe.  
Discussions 
Even assuming a constant very low probability per laboratory, the global risk of an accident has 
increased owing to the proliferation of BSL-4 laboratories. In addition, new facilities were mostly 
established in high-density urban areas (Fig. 1A), although the impact of this on the combined risk is 
more difficult to assess. However, recent results of simulation models suggest that urbanization of 
BSL-4 laboratories would indeed increase the risk that an accidental release could not be contained 
[9]. The total population of people living in the vicinity of BSL-4 laboratories is one of several factors 
that may affect the chance that an accidentally released pathogen would trigger an epidemic. A 
comprehensive quantification of this risk would require a robust and complex pathogen-specific 
epidemic model accounting for epidemiology, age structure, contact rates, transport networks, 
intervention and diagnosis capacities of each country hosting a BSL-4 laboratory [20]. Since, 
experiments on potentially pandemic pathogens such as influenza or SARS are currently also 
authorized in BSL-3/3+ laboratories, such pathogen-specific assessment should also include the BSL-
3/3+ facilities that have engaged on research on those pathogens. Instead we have adopted a simple 
approach, focusing on BSL-4 laboratories, and quantifying the local population in their immediate 
vicinity. This resonates with the intuitive understanding that the consequences of an infectious 
disease agent may be very different should it escape a laboratory located in cities like London or 
Bhopal as opposed to remote areas such as Těchonin in the Czech Republic or in the Rocky 
Mountains in the USA.  
Research on potentially dangerous disease agents has many scientific and societal benefits; however 
these must always be weighed against their low-probability but high-impact risks. The recent 
multiplication of BSL-4 laboratories, not to mention BSL-3 laboratories that are far more numerous 
and harder to identify, raises one key question. Can the multiplication of the number of laboratories 
and their installation in densely populated areas cause a substantial increase in the risk of a man-
triggered epidemic or pandemic? The results presented in this paper indicate that this may indeed be 
the case. Whilst competition between research groups and countries is a stimulating factor in 
research, there is the possibility for unnecessary repetition of potentially dangerous experiments and 
hence an associated replication of risk. The current situation, whereby new BSL-4 facilities tend to be 
located in regions of high population density, may ultimately result in the risks of an artificial 
outbreak occurring outweighing the risk of a naturally-arising global pandemic, as recently discussed 
in several opinion papers [21,22]. The scientific community and policy makers therefore need to 
strike a careful balance between scientific competition, national independence and global risk. Better 
international cooperation and harmonization of regulation in this very particular field of research 
could have both an immediate and substantial impact on the risk of future outbreaks.  
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Figure 1 
 
Distribution of BSL-4 Laboratories and population. Global distribution of Biosafety Level 4 
Laboratories (A). Population density and commuting belts of 30 minutes around Biosafety Level 4 
Laboratories in Western Europe (B) South of England (C) and East Cost of the United States (D). 
  
Figure 2 
 
 
Global population living in the immediate vicinity of BSL-4 laboratories since 1990. The yellow to 
red lines highlights that a significant part of this increase is due to the fact that new laboratories 
were established in densely populated urban areas. The dashed grey line shows that subtracting the 
growth in human population during the last two decades has a negligible effect on the increase of 
population. 
 
  
Figure 3  
 
Regional trends in the evolution of the population living in the immediate vicinity of BSL-4 
laboratories since 1990.  (A) Distribution of population within BSL-4 laboratories commuting belts by 
region after 2012. (B) Evolution of the  top 10 BSL-4 hosting the largest population in their 
commuting belt since 1990. (USA United States; UK United Kingdom; ZA, South Africa; RU Russia (and 
previously USSR); SG Singapore; TW Taiwan; AUS Australia; ITA Italy; IND India; DE Germany; FR 
France; CA Canada) 
Supplementary Figure 1 
 
Comparative map of commuting belts around Biosafety Level 4 Laboratories in Northern Germany. Colors scale indicates the duration/distance of the 
commute for 10 (green), 30 (red) and 60 (blue) minutes/kilometers.   
Supplementary Figure 2 
 
Global population living in the immediate vicinity of BSL-4 since 1990. Millions of people  by population density classes for commuting belts of 60, 30, 10  
minutes (top) and 60, 30, 10 kilometers (bottom)  
  
Supplementary Table 1. Current List of BSL-4 Facilities* 
Institution Code Location Country Operational Date 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention USA-CDC Georgia, Atlanta USA 1988 
Center for Biotechnology and Drug Design Georgia State University USA-GSU Georgia, Atlanta USA 1994 
Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services USA-DCLS Virginia, Richmond USA 2003 
United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases USA-USAMRIID Maryland, Fort Detrick USA 1969 
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) USA-NBACC Maryland, Fort Detrick USA 2008 
Integrated Research Facility USA-IRF Maryland, Fort Detrick USA 2009 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) USA-NIH Maryland, Bethesda USA <1985 
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) USA-NBAF Manhattan, Kansas USA 2020 
NIAID Rocky Mountain Laboratories USA-NIAID Montana, Hamilton USA 2008 
Galveston National Laboratory, National Biocontainment Facility USA-GNL Texas, Galveston USA 2008 
Center for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Shope Laboratory USA-SHOPE Texas, Galveston USA 2003 
Texas Biomedical Research Institute (Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research) USA-TBRI Texas, San Antonio USA 2000 
National Microbiology Laboratory CA-NML Manitoba, Winnipeg Canada 1999 
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) AUS-AAHL Victoria, Geelong Australia 1985 
National High Security Laboratory (NHSQL); Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory AUS-NHSQL  Victoria, North Melbourne Australia 1996 
Virology Laboratory of the Queensland Department of Health AUS-VLQ Queensland, Coopers Plains Australia  >2000 
Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biohazard Response Unit AUS-EIDBRU Westmead Australia 2007 
Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences CN-WUHAN Hubei, Wuhan China 2010 
Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology IND_HYD Hyderabad India 2010 
National Institute of Virology, Indian council of medical research IND-NIV Pune India 2012 
High Security Animal Disease Laboratory (HSADL) IND-BO Bhopal India 2000 
State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR RU-VEKTOR Novosibirsk Oblast, Koltsovo Russia <1990 
Institute of Microbiology RU-KIR Kirov Russia <1990 
Virological Center of the Institute of Microbiology  RU-SER Sergiev Possad Russia <1990 
Defence Science Organization  SG-DSO Singapore Singapore 2003 
Kwen-yang Laboratory Center of Disease Control (Taiwan)  TW-CDC Taipei, Taiwan Taiwan >2003 
Preventive Medical Institute of ROC Ministry of National Defense TW-PMI Taiwan Taiwan <2003 
Republican Research and Practical Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology BL-RRPCEM Minsk Belarus <2000 
Army Center for Medical Research ROM-AMR Romania Romania >2011 
Laboratory for Biological Monitoring and Protection CZR-KAM  Kammena Czech Rep. 2007 
State Veterinary Institute Prague CZR-PRA Prague Czech Rep. 2007 
Biological Defense Center CZR-TEC Techonin  Czech Rep. >2005 
National Center for Epidemiology HUN-NCE Hungary Hungary 2002 
Laboratoire P4 Jean Mérieux FR-JM Rhône-Alpes, Lyon France 1999 
Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine DE-HAM Hamburg Germany <1987 
Friedrich Loeffler Institute on the Isle of Riems DE-FLI the Isle of Riems (Greifswald) Germany 2011 
Philipps University of Marburg DE-MAR Marburg Germany 2007 
Robert Koch Institute DE-BER Berlin Germany 2013 
Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale Luigi Sacco ITA-MIL Lombardy, Milano Italy >2007 
Istituto Nazionale Malattie Infettive ITA-INMI Rome Italy 2012 
Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) NL-RIVM Bilthoven Netherlands 2010 
Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control SW-SMI Solna Sweden 2001 
High Containment Laboratory DDPS (SiLab) CH-SILAB Spiez Switzerland 2011 
University of Geneva (P4D) CH-HUG Geneva Switzerland 2007 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory UK-DSTL Porton Down, Wiltshire UK 2005 
Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Health Protection Agency (HPA) UK-HPA-SPRU Porton Down, Wiltshire UK <1987 
Health Protection Agency's Centre for Infections UK-HPA-CIS Colindale UK <1987 
National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC) UK-NIBSC Potters Bar, Hertfordshire UK 1987 
Veterinary Laboratories Agency UK-VLA Addlestone, Surrey UK  <2003 
Institute for Animal Health UK-IAH Pirbright UK 2006 
Merial Animal Health Ltd UK-MER Pirbright UK 2007 
National Institute for Medical Research UK-NIMR  London UK 2006 
Schering-Plough Animal Health UK-SP Harefield UK 2007 
Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville GA-CIRMF Franceville Gabon 1998 
National Institute for Communicable Diseases ZA-NICD Johannesburg South Africa 1980 
*Geographical coordinate of each facility can be requested directly to the authors. 
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